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	MEMORANDUM FOR:	The Director of Central	Intelligence
		MILITARY NEWS: "Radio D Radio Counteraction", by M. Masterov	Engineer Colonel
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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence U. S. Air Force

The Director, Mational Security Agency

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence





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COUNTRY: USSR 50X1-HUM

SUBJECT: MILITARY NEWS: "Radio Deception as a

Means of Radio Counteraction", by Engineer

Colonel M. Masterov

DATE OF INFO: January 1961


APPRAISAL OF

CONTENT: Documentary

SOURCE: A reliable source (B)

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Radio Deception as a Means of Radio Counteraction", by Engineer Colonel M. Masterov. This article appeared in Issue No. 34, 1961, of the Soviet military publication Collection of Articles of the Journal Military News (Voyennyy Vestnik.) This publication is classified SECRET by the Soviets and is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense.

According to the Preface, Issue No. 34 was sent for typesetting on 14 December 1960 and released to the printer on 25 January 1961. The Preface states that articles express the opinions of their authors and are published as a form of discussion. Distribution of Issue No. 34 was to officers from regimental commander upward.



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	Radio Deception as a Means of I	Radio Counteraction	1
	by		
	Engineer Colonel M. M.	a3terov	50X1-HUM
	In the last phase of the engagement of Stalingrad in World War II, the head Army tried to establish direct radio commanstein's grouping. For a long time, headquarters of the 6th Army called a (vzaimodeystvuyushchiy korrespondent) not get a reply. Then our radio intelliguous posing as the station being called, estathe radio station of the headquarters of the course of 24 hours received 16 mestover 1500 groups. Other instances of radio deception well known, but they were isolated, and little to the disorganization of the enem	quarters of the 6th ntact with Field Ma the radio station of collaborating station of to make contact, it gence personnel (rablished a two-way lithe 6th Army and of sages from it amount (dezinformatsiya) and on the whole, contact, it is a second	German irshal of the n but could idiorazvedchik), link with during inting to tributed
	In the postwar period, ever-increato radio deception. For example, in the exercise in 1959, the headquarters of of 10 organic (tabelnyy) shortwave radio since 12 radio-jamming sets in the shortwave and radio-jamming. During the course attacking "Eastern" army was conductionable the eastern bank of the Deepr Femployed massed radio-jamming of the and of two-station links (radionapravlementarying to reestablish its interrupted radional control of the eastern bank of the eastern bank of the Deepr Femployed massed radio-jamming of the and of two-station links (radionapravlementarying to reestablish its interrupted radional control of the eastern bank of the deep terminal control of two-station links (radionapravlementarying to reestablish its interrupted radional control of the eastern bank of the deep terminal control of the eastern bank of the deep terminal control of the eastern bank of the deep terminal control of the eastern bank of the deep terminal control of the eastern bank of the deep terminal control of the eastern bank of the deep terminal control of the eastern bank of the deep terminal control of the eastern bank of the deep terminal control of the eastern bank of the deep terminal control of the eastern bank of the deep terminal control of the eastern bank of the deep terminal control of the eastern bank of the deep terminal control of the eastern bank of the deep terminal control of the eastern bank of the deep terminal control of the eastern bank of	e strategic commander of the fronts allowers of medium power band for radio decrease, we not the exercise, we may battles to liquidately the "West" use main army radio mains). While the "E	nd-staff otted er and ception then the ate a bridge- anexpectedly networks East" was
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"West", carrying out radio deception, made contact with the "enemy". In the most tense period of the operation they transmitted up to 90 training cipher messages (uchebnaya shifrogramma) amounting to more than 5000 groups, as a result of which they misled the "enemy's" radio stations for about 100 hours.

Another example. On an aviation exercise in the Carpathian Military District in 1958, false commands were transmitted to fighter aircraft in order to deceive the "enemy" bombers. The objective was attained: the "enemy" bombers took appropriate countermeasures (cover, maneuver etc.) according to the false commands they had intercepted.

Radio deception is effective if it is practiced unexpectedly on the enemy in critical periods of a battle or an operation, when the enemy's radio and radio relay communications are loaded to maximum capacity with operational conversations or with the interchange of cipher messages, and especially when there is loss of radio contact between headquarters and control points.

It is possible to enter into communications with enemy radio stations under the guise of a main, subordinate, or neighboring radio station.

It is advisable to employ the first two methods primarily in command and headquarters radio networks and the third in collaborating radio networks. In headquarters and command radio networks and two-station links, contact is made on the principle of the subordination of radio stations of the lower headquarters to the higher (main radio stations). Collaborating radio communication is conducted either by special radio networks or by collaborating units and large units entering into communications with adjacent headquarters radio networks.


It is most convenient to enter into communications under the guise of a main radio station when it appears that as a result of moving, defective equipment, or inattention of the crew (team)



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or the duty shift, it doe stations	s not answer the repeate	ed calls of subordinate
of a subordinate radio s	e to enter into communication at those times whereason, do not answer to network (two-station)	he calls of the main
neighboring radio static organization of the radio radio networks are org headquarters has its organd callsigns, then by one can make contact to But if collaborating radiosis then as in the	er into communications to on, one should distinguis to networks. If the energianized on receiver wave we individual and rigidly having complete data on without particular difficultion networks are working e first two instances, it ontact or the loss of communications.	ny's cellaborating elengths when each fixed frequencies such radio networks lty with any of them. g on general fre- is most advisable to
work (two-station links	between the stations of s) are stable, radio dece nediately detect an "outs for the protection of his	eption is not advisable, sider" station and take
may be recommended messages transmitted of long cipher messag addressees, assigning	es (code messages) to ti	sting a repeat of cipner ations, the transmission he enemy with correct hications to enemy radio
radio stations are sel that the characteristic respond to the characteristic from the accepted for	ected for radio deception is of emission of the set teristics of enemy radio m of transmission, alts	s selected another cor- sets. Any deviation

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the deception. No less important is the training of the operators. It is clear that only radio operators of the highest grade, completely conversant with the rules of the enemy army's radio traffic, must be allowed to do this work.

The fundamental principles of employing radio deception are surprise and concentrating it in the most crucial periods of a battle (operation) and in the most important enemy radio networks (two-station links).

The surprise factor has great importance. As experience shows, it is advisable to employ various methods of radio deception simultaneously with radio-jamming.

putting into action of all forces and equipment allotted for radio deception. At the same time their efforts must be aimed at disorganizing radio communications in specific large units. It is not advisable to dissipate resources among radio networks of large units. It is essential to concentrate the main efforts on the disruption of those radio networks and two-station links, the frustration of whose work materially affects the control and coordination of the enemy groupings that are most important at a given moment. Let us note that it is advisable to make use of moments when the control of enemy troops is based mainly on radio communications not duplicated by other means.

For organizing and carrying out effective radio deception, it is important to have full data about the enemy's radio system, to know which of his radio stations belong to one or another radio network, the list of frequencies and callsigns being used, the procedure for their change, the system of addressing and identification (parolirovaniye).

Radio deception is a difficult and complex matter. It is an art of its own which consists in the ability to deceive an experienced enemy, and it is necessary to master it in peacetime.

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